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RECENT DECISIONS
Jury Trial - Demand as Condition Precedent to Right - Upon
petition of attorneys the Supreme Court of- Wisconsin abrogated the
recently enacted rule of court, incorporated in the 1945 Wisconsin
Statutes as Section 270.32, which provided that parties to an action
must affirmatively ask for a jury trial. At the same time the Court
reinstated the former rule which gives the right to trial by jury as a
matter of course unless affirmatively waived.' The rule now ousted
had provided that any of the litigants might demand a jury by serving
upon the other parties to the action, and filing with the court, a demand
therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action,
and not later than ten days after service of the last pleading directed
to the issue. Unless such demand was made, the right was deemed
waived, subject to the discretion of the court. Once a jury had been
requested however, the parties could withdraw such request only
by written stipulation filed in court or by an oral stipulation made
in open court and recorded in the minutes. 2 The considerations which
influenced the Court to abrogate this rule were: (1) That the rule
put an undue procedural burden on the constitutional right of trial
by jury; (2) That in practice the rule effected little economy in
either time or money saved, as the practice of asking for a jury
at the commencement of each action, and later waiving the right by
stipulation of the parties at the time of trial was consistently used.
Consequently the court was in no better position to judge the number
of cases that would require a jury trial than under the former pro-
cedure; (3) That since the court still had power to allow a jury
to be called at its discretion, regardless of waiver, the rule had little
finality. In re Doar, 21 N.W. (2d) 1, (1945, Wis.)
The right to trial by jury was one of the privileges most zealously
guarded by the American colonists, and preserved in the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution.3 A similar statement is contained
'Wis. Stats., (1943) Sec. 270.32. "Trial by jury may be waived by the several
parties to an issue of fact by failing to appear at the trial; or by written con-
sent filed with the clerk; or by consent in open court entered in the minutes."
2Wis. Stats., (1945), Sec. 270.32. Jur1 Trial. (1) Demand for Jury. (a) Any
party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by
serving upon the other parties and filing with the court a demand therefor
in writing at any time after commencement thereof and not later than ten
days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue . . . (3)
Waiver of Jury. The failure of a party to serve and file a demand therefor
constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made
as herein provided cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
(4) Trial by jury. The trial of issues so demanded shall be by jury unless the
parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court
or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, con-
sent to trial by the court sitting without a jury or the court finds that a right
of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist. (5) Trial by
Court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury shall be tried by the court; but,
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in nearly every state constitution,4 and these provisions determine the
limits beyond which no legislature may go in regulating trial by jury.
However, the Federal Constitution and those of the states preserve
only the right of trial by jury, and do not make such a trial a
necessity, unless one of the parties desires it.5 In recent years the
trend has been toward a trial of issues by the court alone, as evi-
denced by the passage of statutes similar to the recently repealed
Wisconsin rule of court in many jurisdictions ;6 and by the provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are almost identical
with the now abrogated Wisconsin rule in this matter.- However,
it is now well settled that if the requirements which the parties must
meet to save their right are reasonable, the law is not unconstitutional.,
This was forcefully pointed out by the Wisconsin Supremc Court
in the instant hearing, the Court stating in its opinion that the Wis-
consin rule was not only constitutional, but eminently fair and reason-
able in its demands.,
In urging the passage several years ago of the former rule, peti-
tioners before the Court -urged: (1) That in all the courts of Wis-
consin, except the circuit court, a party waived a jury trial in a
civil action unless he demanded one; (2) That the rule would bring
about greater conformity with the practice in the federal courts
under the new Federal Rules; (3) That economy would result from
notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action or special
proceeding in which such demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues."
3 United States Constitution, Amendments, Art. VII. "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
common law."
4 Conn. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 21; Constitution of Indiana, Art. I, Sec. 13;
Constitution of the State of Iowa, Art I, Sec. 9; Constitution of Minnesota,
Art. I, Sec. 4; The Constitution of the State of New York, Art I, Sec. 2; Wis-
consin Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 6.
5 Lewis v. Garrett's Adm'rs., 5 Howard *434, (Mississippi, 1840).6 Illinois Revised Statutes, (1937), Ch. 110, Sec. 188; Iowa Code, (1935), Sec.
1074; Mich. Courth Rules Ann., (Searl, 1933), Rule 33. (For comparison of
provisions of various state statutes, see 16 U.S. Supreme Court Digest 282,
Notes.)
7 16 U.S. Supreme Court Digest 282.8 McKay v. Fair Haven & W. Ry. Co., 775 Conn. 608, 54 Atl. 923, (1930) ; Sut-
ton v. Gunn, 86 Ga. 652, 12 S.E. 979, (1891). Compare La Bowe v. Balthazor, 180
Wis. 419, 193 N.W. 244, (1923). Here a $24 jury fee in a municipal court hav-
ing a maximum civil jurisdiction of $1000.00 was held unreasonable and
unconstitutional.
SIn re Doar, 21 N.W. (2d) 1 at 4, (Wis., 1945), in which the Court says,
"Indeed it would be difficult to maintain such an argument, since under the
rule all that a party needs to do to get a jury trial is to ask for it, and since
the rule further provides that if he does not ask for it at the proper time, he
may renew his request later, and the court may disregard the waiver and call
in a jury. The latter provision leaves virtually nothing even of the contention
that a party who wants a jury trial may occasionally be deprived of it by the
negligence of his counsel."
1946]
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apprising a judge in advance of the number of cases which were to
be tried by jury, thus avoiding the expense of calling that body
whenever possible. 10
Additional reasons for the adoption of the rule, as set forth by
students of the problem, are: (1) The procedure of the court is
simplified;"' (2) "The question of mode of trial is eliminated in
all jury-waived cases at an early stage of the proceedings ." 2
The rule that a person must make an affirmative demand for a
jury has been interpreted under the federal practice as a mere pro-
cedural change, which in no way enlarges or curtails the abstract
right of the submission of a cause to a jury. If the party formerly
had the right to such a trial, it still exists; but it does not give a
person the privilege of a jury in a case in which equitable relief
is demanded or where the issues have been customarily decided by
the court.'3 The same is true under the various state rules on this
question. It is obvious however that the automatic waiver provision
requires alertness on the part of the attorney to save the right of
his client to a jury trial, and that by slight neglect or misunder-
standing of the requirements of the law, he may find that he has
waived such trial to the detriment of the party he represents.
1 4
However even the attorney who understands the requirements
of the waiver provision may experience difficulty in deciding whether
or not to enter a demand for a jury because: (1) He may not yet
have a complete picture of the suit, as all of the pleadings may not
be before him when the period of demand expires; and (2)
Under the blended system of law and equity, he may find it hard
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 See Sunderland, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where
Juries Are Waived", 4 U. of Chic. L. Rev. 218 at 219, (1937), in which the
author states; "When, accordingly, waiver of juries in law actions was au-
thorized, there was no necessity, from the point of view of trial convenience,
for retaining any counterpart of the mechanism by which court and jury
communicated with each other. By combining both functions in the judge he
could proceed directly to decide the case, without, as judge, expressly inform-
ing himself, as jury, what legal principles should be employed in reaching a
general decision, or as jury, expressly informing himself, as judge, what facts
had been found."
12 James, "Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure", 45 Yale
Law Journal 1022, at 1047, (1936).
23 Morris, "Jury Trials Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity", 20 Tex.
Law Rev. 427, (1942).
14 See Gunther v. H. W. Gossard Co., 27 Fed. Supp. 995, (N.Y., 1939), in which
demand for trial was filed with the answer to the counter-claim and more
than ten days after the filing of the answer to the complaint. A jury trial was
allowed only on the issues raised by the counterclaim, and not on those set
forth in the complaint, as the time for demanding a jury to hear the main
controversy had elapsed.
[Vol. 30
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to determine whether his client's case is one in which there could
be a jury as a matter of right.15
Consequently it appears that experienced attorneys, not wishing
to accept the burden of -determining this question, have made a
practice of leaving it to the court, upon whom it rested before the
revision of the rule, by making a demand in all cases. That this has
evidently been the tendency in Wisconsin is indicated by the state-
ment of the Court in the instant case:
"It will not accomplish the results hoped for by the Ad-
visory Committee . . . It appears that the practice of lawyers
has already become established to put a demand for a jury trial
in all pleadings without regard to the appropriateness of the
case for a jury trial, leaving to a later ruling of the court
or a stipulation of the parties the final determination whether
the case will be tried by the court or by the jury."'1
Theoretically the arguments in favor of the demand requirement
are strong. However most of them appear to have been predictions
or generalizations as to the beneficial results of the automatic waiver
rule. Moreover the real basis for judging its value is by considering
its actual effect on court procedure. Since the courts and lawyers
of this state have not found it either practical or acceptable, and
have refused to make use of the provisions as it was intended to
be used, it is evident that it has no value as a rule of court in
Wisconsin, and was rightly repealed.
FRANCES M. RYAN
15McCaskill, "Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure", 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 315, (1940), at 317; where the author says of Federal Rule No. 38,
which was the foundation of the Wisconsin rule in question; "The Rule
does not purport to state what issues are properly triable to a jury. It is
assumed that this is known. A party knowing the extent of his right is given
the privilege of claiming the whole or any part of it. A party who does not
know whether he has a right, or who is uncertain of its extent, is permitted
to experiment, demanding what he wishes. Presumably what he will get will
be measured by what he should have, if the trial court can determine it any
better than he can, unless what he may have is more than what he has wished
for, in which event the wish governs. If he does not want to run the risk of
asking for too little, and this seems to be characteristic of careful practitioners,
he may gamble on the court's knowledge. If the court is in doubt, and wishes
to play safe, he may get more than he is entitled to." And again at 329; "Dis-
tinctions between actions at law and suits in equity are so thoroughly abolished
that in many cases it will be impossible to determine the proper scope of jury
trial, and jury demands under Rule 38 will be arrows shot in the dark. The
wishes of the parties, or the guesses of the trial judges, rather than the Con-
stitution, will determine what is obtained."
16 1n re Daar, 21 NW (2d) 1, (1945, Wis.), at p. 4.
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